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Introduction
Among attorneys, judges, and legal academics, there is virtual consensus
that the widespread use by business firms of standard-form contracts in their
dealings with consumers has completely eliminated bargaining in consumer
contracts. I believe that this perception is false, that rather than precluding
bargaining and negotiation, standard-form contracts in fact facilitate bargaining and are a crucial instrument in the establishment and maintenance
of cooperative relationships between firms and their customers. On this
view, which I elaborate below, firms use clear and unconditional standardform contract terms not because they will insist upon those terms, but because they have given their managerial employees the discretion to grant
exceptions from the standard-form terms on a case-by-case basis. In practice, acting through its agents, a firm will often provide benefits to
consumers who complain beyond those that its standard form obligates it to
provide, and it will forgive consumer breach of standard-form terms. Firms
do this because they have an interest in building and maintaining cooperative, value-enhancing relationships with their customers. Were firms legally
required to extend such benefits or forgiveness—as would result either from
judicial invalidation of the tough standard-form performance terms or legislatively mandated generous standard-form performance terms—then both
firms and their customers would be worse off.
Most of my analysis here is concerned with standard-form terms of performance: contract terms that set out, for example, the amounts and
repayment dates on a consumer loan, or an airline passenger’s rights to be
upgraded to a first-class seat. While my main concern is with such standardform performance terms, I also discuss what may be called standard-form
breakdown terms—terms that determine where and how an “endgame” dis1
pute over breach of the performance terms will be resolved. Unlike
performance terms, which firms intend to forgive or expand upon when so
doing is consistent with building and maintaining valuable customer relationships, breakdown terms are not meant to be varied, since breakdown
1. My discussion of these “endgame” standard-form terms relies, for its inspiration and
terminology, on Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001).
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signals that no mutually beneficial customer relationship exists. Moreover,
the optimal breakdown terms are those that maximize the firm’s incentives
to pursue discretionary, cooperative tailoring of its customer relationships.
By systematically overcompensating consumers with large claims against
business firms, and undercompensating those who have relatively small
claims against such firms, the civil justice system blunts or eliminates such
incentives. By offering a more predictable and more uniform schedule of
damages, private arbitration can offer a form of endgame dispute resolution
that allows firms to focus more on business value and less on litigation risk
in negotiating the terms of their ongoing consumer relationships.
My analysis of both standard-form performance and standard-form
breakdown terms generates some advice for courts employing common law
contract doctrines. Courts should presume that standard-form contract terms
are a valid and enforceable part of the bargain between business firms, their
customers, and their employees. At the same time, however, courts must
recognize that opportunistic firms will use standard forms to renege on
promises to offer the tailored and flexible forgiveness and accommodation
offered by good firms. To prevent such behavior, courts should enforce additional promises or concessions made by agents of the firm that go beyond
standard-form obligations, provided that there is clear evidence that such
promises were actually made. Courts should also ensure that standard-form
arbitration clauses do indeed offer uniform and predictable remedies, rather
than no remedies at all.
Part II of this Article presents empirical evidence demonstrating that
firms routinely grant their agents the authority to exercise their discretion to
forgive the breach of and extend benefits beyond standard-form consumercontract terms. Such a strategy of using ex-ante clear and unconditional
standard-form contract obligations together with discretionary ex-post forgiveness or ex-post benefit conferral comprises what I call a “two-part
standard-form contract.” Part III develops an economic, game-theoretic explanation for such two–part standard-form contracts, how firms determine
the optimal combination of standard-form terms and ex-post discretion, and
why they could not accomplish the same socially desirable strategic goal if
they were not permitted to exercise the discretion to vary standard-form
terms. Part IV discusses the model’s implications for traditional legal concerns about the distributive impact of standard-form consumer contracts.
Part V explains implications for doctrines that determine the enforceability
of promises that vary or add to the terms of standard-form contracts. Part VI
analyzes how standard-form breakdown terms determine the viability of the
optimal two-part standard-form contract. I begin in Part I with a brief intellectual history of academic and judicial thinking about standard-form
contracts.
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I. From Contracts of Adhesion to Market Assent
2

As Friedrich Kessler famously observed over sixty years ago, the latenineteenth-century development of mass production and mass distribution of
3
consumer goods brought with it the standardized mass-consumer contract.
Just like consumer goods, standardized contracts are mass marketed. On the
4
traditional story told by legal scholars, a firm’s attorneys write the terms of
these contracts, which then accompany the sale of all the firm’s products (or,
increasingly, services). Between the consumer and the sales agent (or retailer), there is no bargaining over the terms of such contracts. They are
automatically bundled together with the sale of the good or service.
In its core doctrines, the common law of contracts was already well developed when standardized consumer contracts appeared on the scene. One
of those core doctrines is that a legally enforceable contract requires “a
5
manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange,” or, in somewhat more colloquial terms, an agreement. Induced from a body of case law dealing
largely with non-standard, negotiated transactions, the common law’s paradigm for the “manifestation of mutual assent” is that of a bargaining process
which culminates when one party makes an offer that the other finally ac6
cepts.
The paradigmatic standardized consumer transaction does not, however,
involve an individualized negotiation over price and other terms, but rather
the posting of set prices for goods and services with standardized (albeit
typically varying) characteristics. In the modern economy, consumer sales
occur not through the haggling and dickering of the market bazaar, but
rather through the cool, calm efficiency of mass retailing. While it is possible to uncover (create?) an “offer” and “acceptance” pattern even in
common, standardized consumer transactions, it must be conceded that
those sales do not emerge from the kind of individualized bargaining process that gave rise to the offer and acceptance paradigm. While common-law
judges understood that mass production and marketing brought consumers a
once unimaginable diversity of products and services delivered by producers
who were pressured by constant competition to keep prices and costs down,
they found it hard to see how consumers were legally assenting to the standard-form contract used in such a world. Indeed, judges and legal scholars
viewed market-driven uniformity in standard-form contract terms with
alarm, perceiving that even in reasonably competitive markets, consumers
2. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 631 (1943).
3. Standardized product warranties, for example, were apparently found as early as the latenineteenth century. See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale L.J.
1297, 1299 (1981).
4. For one statement of this story, see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1174, 1225 (1983).
5.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17 (1981).

6. The various rules on offer and acceptance are found at Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §§ 24–70 (1981).
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often had no choice of contract terms, so that a consumer’s apparent contractual assent to such terms was really “but a subjection more or less
voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms whose consequences
7
are often understood only in a vague way, if at all.” Uniform standardized
8
contracts became subject to the epithet “contracts of adhesion.”
By the 1970s, both courts and commentators had reached a virtual con9
sensus regarding the evil of form contracts. As recounted by George Priest,
academic commentators viewed standard-form consumer-product warranties
10
variously as a form of fraud or as evidence that consumer product manufacturers had unbridled discretion to draft standard-form terms such as
11
warranties simply to minimize their costs. Courts across the country followed the New Jersey Supreme Court’s famous decision in Henningsen v.
12
Bloomfield Motors, Inc. refusing to enforce the terms of a standard-form
warranty disclaiming the implied warranty of merchantability and excluding
liability for consequential damages in a case involving serious bodily injury.
That court’s reasoning is worth quoting in detail, for its tone perfectly captures the view of standard-form contracts that prevailed during this period:
The warranty before us is a standardized form designed for mass use.
It is imposed upon the automobile consumer. He takes it or leaves it, and
he must take it to buy an automobile. No bargaining is engaged in with respect to it. In fact, the dealer through whom it comes to the buyer is
without authority to alter it . . . . The form warranty is not only standard
with Chrysler but . . . it is the uniform warranty of the Automobile Manufacturers Association. . . .
The gross inequality of bargaining position occupied by the consumer
in the automobile industry is thus apparent. There is no competition among
the car makers in the area of the express warranty. Where can the buyer go
to negotiate for better protection? . . . Because there is no competition
among the motor vehicle manufacturers with respect to the scope of protection guaranteed to the buyer, there is no incentive on their part to
13
stimulate good will in that field of public relations. . . .

7. Kessler, supra note 2, at 632. Such a perception was widespread across the ideological
spectrum, with Lord Devlin, hardly someone whom one would consider a great progressive, arguing
stridently that “[i]f the modern lawyer had to single out the contract which now bears most marks of
oppressive and unfair dealing, I think he would probably select one in the mass of small print which
the large concern thrusts upon the small man in a ‘take it or leave it way.’ ” Patrick Devlin, The
Enforcement of Morals 49 (1968, 1972 reprint).
8. This term, as Kessler recounts, originated quite early in the twentieth century, with
Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 198, 222 (1919).
Kessler, supra note 2, at 632 n.11
9.

Priest, supra note 3, at 1300–02.

10. W. David Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1,
12 (1974).
11. William C. Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 1006.
12.

161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).

13.

Id. at 87.
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This basic reasoning—stressing the uniformity within an industry as
showing lack of consumer choice—was applied by courts in refusing to enforce standard-form terms similarly limiting the liability of mass-product
14
and service providers in other fields, such as landlords.
Such reasoning suffered from two very basic weaknesses. On the one
hand, the theory underlying it—what Priest aptly labeled the exploitation
15
theory of the consumer standard-form contract —did not have any explanation for uniform standard-form contract terms other than that they reflected
the untrammeled power of firms to maximize profits at consumers’ expense.
And with such a weak explanation for the supposedly problematic observed
empirical regularity, it was perhaps not surprising that courts never really
fashioned a coherent doctrinal test for when they would enforce standardform terms and when they would not. On the one hand, it seemed as if
courts were only really concerned with standard-form adhesion terms if they
appeared in contracts for goods or services—such as autos or housing—that
16
judges thought were really important or necessary. On the other hand, what
courts really seemed to worry about when determining whether the standard-form terms would be enforced or instead struck down as
unconscionable was not the importance of the good or service, but the relative sophistication of a particular consumer, her education and income level,
and the circumstances under which the standard-form terms were presented
17
for her perusal. The suggested solutions of some academics, such as Todd
Rakoff’s proposal that (under circumstances identified by a seven-factor
test) courts impose a fiduciary obligation on sellers of consumer goods and
services to act only in the consumer’s interest, rather than in the interest of
their own firm’s profit and sales goals, apparently represented too great a
departure from the background principles of free markets for the courts to
18
adopt.
Into this explanatory and doctrinal gap strode the law-and-economics
scholars of the 1980s. Early in that decade, Schwartz and Wilde demonstrated in a general theoretical setting how even a quite small proportion of
smart consumers who actually read and shopped for good standard-form
contract clauses could put enough competitive pressure on firms so that they
would adopt efficient standard-form terms (terms whose cost to the firm was

14.

See, e.g., Galligan v. Arovitch, 219 A.2d 463 (Pa. 1966).

15.

See, e.g., Priest, supra note 3, at 1309.

16. For instance, in Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 177 N.E.2d 925, 927 (N.Y. 1961), the
court enforced a liability disclaimer in a gym membership agreement, stating that “[h]ere there is no
special legal relationship and no overriding public interest which demand that this contract provision, voluntarily entered into by competent parties, should be rendered ineffectual.”
17. With the classic statement of this attitude, leading to invalidation of a standard-form
consumer-installment sales contract’s cross-collateralization clause, being Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.D.C. 1965).
18.

See Rakoff, supra note 4, at 1248–83.
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less than the value that consumers placed upon them). In a quite different,
20
but equally persuasive, methodological spirit, Priest showed that the observed variation across product types in the scope and length of consumer
warranties could be explained as optimally allocating responsibility for
product malfunction between the producer and the consumer. By the end of
the decade, it seemed that both uniformity and variation in standard-form
mass-transaction contracts could be explained as the product not of consumer ignorance and firm power, but of (sufficiently) informationally
efficient markets. Regardless of whether any particular consumer had ever
read, understood, or bargained over the terms of the standard form, informed
consumers generated a form of hypothetical market assent, which would
bind all consumers.
21
The theory of market assent has always had its academic skeptics, but
by the 1990s (in large part through the influence of opinions written by lawand-economics scholars turned federal judges), this theory of market assent
had even been accepted by the Supreme Court. In upholding the enforceability of a standard-form forum-selection clause in a consumer cruise-line
ticket (under a “fundamental fairness” test it had set up under its admiralty
jurisdiction), the Court was untroubled by the uniformity of the clause
within the industry, and remarkably confident in the reality of market assent:
[R]espondents’ passage contract was purely routine and doubtless nearly
identical to every commercial passage contract issued by petitioner and
most other cruise lines. In this context, it would be entirely unreasonable
for us to assume that respondents—or any other cruise passenger—would
negotiate with petitioner the terms of a forum-selection clause in an ordinary commercial cruise ticket. Common sense dictates that a ticket of this
kind will be a form contract the terms of which are not subject to negotiation, and that an individual purchasing the ticket will not have bargaining
parity with the cruise line. . . .
. . . . [Still, i]ncluding a reasonable forum clause in a form contract of
this kind well may be permissible for several reasons: First, a cruise line
has a special interest in limiting the fora in which it potentially could be
subject to suit. Because a cruise ship typically carries passengers from
many locales, it is not unlikely that a mishap on a cruise could subject the
cruise line to litigation in several different fora. Additionally, a clause establishing ex ante the forum for dispute resolution has the salutary effect of
dispelling any confusion about where suits arising from the contract must
be brought and defended, sparing litigants the time and expense of pretrial
motions to determine the correct forum and conserving judicial resources
19. The seminal presentation of this claim to the legal academy is Alan Schwartz & Louis L.
Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1983).
20.

Priest, supra note 3, at 1298.

21. See, e.g., Jeffrey Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit Contract Law, 68 Va. L. Rev.
1333, 1345 (1982) (arguing that some credit suppliers are immune to market pressures, which are in
any event significantly attenuated because too small a proportion of consumers shop for desirable
credit terms).
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that otherwise would be devoted to deciding those motions. Finally, it
stands to reason that passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum
clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which
22
it may be sued.

As the twentieth century ended, the confidence of the Court and academic commentators was tested by both new theories and new practices. In
practice, during the 1990s, a new kind of standard-form contract clause, the
mandatory arbitration provision, swept the world of standard-form consumer and employment contracts. While the Court reacted sympathetically
to the advent of standard-form mandatory arbitration clauses—as representing not only a market-driven efficiency, but one that Congress had endorsed
23
in enacting the Federal Arbitration Act —lower state and federal courts
struggled with whether or not such clauses were unenforceable as unconscionable. In legal academia, a new and rising body of scholarship applying
findings from experimental psychology of widespread and serious human
cognitive limitations gave new life to the old exploitation theory of stan24
dard-form terms.
Like existing economic models and judicial doctrine, recent scholarship
applying experimental psychology takes it for granted that standard-form
contracts are not designed to encourage bargaining, but to preclude it. Below
I construct a model that grants (indeed is built upon) the fact that most if not
all individual consumers and employees will never read, let alone understand, all the terms in a firm’s standard-form contract. What my model
reveals, however, is that while this fact may mean that firms and individual
consumers and employees do not bargain over standard-form terms, they
actively bargain in the shadow of those terms.
II. Bargaining around Standard-Form Terms: Some Evidence
My understanding of the economic function of standard-form contracts
begins not with breakdown terms, but with the terms of performance. Virtually every firm that sells goods or services or extends some form of credit to
consumers has certain standard-form contractual terms governing such
things as when and how payment is due, when and if a good can be returned, whether charges are made for services beyond those originally
contracted for, and other related matters. While set out in contractual forms
that are standard in all the firm’s dealings, the evidence shows that the actual
22. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991) (citations omitted)
(relying on and citing the reasoning in Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir.
1990)). For an argument that the market assent reasoning in Shute and similar cases is consistent
with classical contract notions of assent, see Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002).
23.

Codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14, 201–08.

24. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429 (2002); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standardform Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203 (2003).
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implementation of these various policies must be done on a case-by-case
basis, whether by firm employees who work at particular stores, or by
staffers in centralized call centers. The common practice among firms is to
give their employees the discretion to depart from these standard-form terms
and to deliver more than the firm has actually promised if deemed in the
firm’s best interest to do so. Typically, the firm’s standard-form terms set out
clear and unconditional consumer obligations but allow firm discretion that
is exercised by a supervisory (and sometimes lower level) employee who is
given the authority and discretion to forgive. In this part of the Article, I set
out some selected evidence on the pervasiveness of this pattern of contract25
ing, which I call a two-part, or discretionary, standard-form contract.
A. Hospital Bills
A major problem for hospitals and ambulatory-care facilities is nonpayment of medical bills by outpatients. A USA Today article noted that
“[h]ospitals can raise charges to any amount the market will bear, but it’s an
odd market because most hospital customers negotiate discounts off
26
charges.” This statement is borne out by exchanges on The Dollar
27
Stretcher, a mediated online-discussion board, where a patient who inquired about negotiating over hospital bills received a variety of responses.
One woman noted that after she and her husband got a hefty hospital
bill, she called the accounting department immediately to negotiate. “The
thing to do is immediately upon receiving the bill is [sic] call the accounting
office at the hospital and doctors [sic] offices ([if] they send their own bills)
[and] explain that you do not have the funds to pay in full but would like to
28
make monthly payments.”
29
Following the recommendations of industry consultants, many, probably most, hospitals have dedicated “assistance officers” or “financial
counselors,” whose jobs are to work out payment plans with patients. A hospital employee noted that hospital financial counselors “often will negotiate
25. I stress that this is merely a selection. A closer look at many other industries would, I
believe, reveal the same pattern. There is, for instance, evidence that people negotiate with their cell
phone carriers, post-contract. CBS online encourages people to “[n]egotiate with your carrier. If you
see a cheaper deal somewhere else, call your carrier and see if it will offer you something similar.
Carriers are anxious to keep you as a customer, so it never hurts to ask for a better deal.” Become a
Happier Cell Phone Owner, CBS News, Mar. 10, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2005/03/10/earlyshow/living/money/main679246.shtml.
26.

Julie Appleby, Hospital Bills Spin Out of Control, USA Today, Apr. 13, 2004, at A1.

27. Reducing Hospital Bills, Dollar Stretcher, http://www.stretcher.com/stories/980923c.cfm
(last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
28.

Id.

29. See, e.g., Roger J. Hull, Screen Outpatients for Better Collections, Hosp. Fin. Mgmt.,
Nov. 1978, at 32, 32. The author recommends having the computer select out nonpayers from the
patient population and then interviewing such patients individually before treatment to try to identify their ability to pay and to work out individualized monthly payment plans as a precondition for
receiving treatment (excepting, of course, the “obviously ill”). He estimates that one account representative can conduct about forty ten-minute interviews per day and that such interviews
conservatively will bring in 10% of past-due accounts that would otherwise not come in. Id. at 33.
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the charges . . . . [P]hysicians will do the same thing, especially if they know
30
you don’t have insurance.” Another hospital employee stated, “My job requires me to negotiate with medical providers. I can assure you that
hospitals can, and will, negotiate charges. They would rather get paid by you
than turn the bill over to a collection agency, or worse, write the charges
off.” The employee went on, “I would explain your financial situation, and
offer a lowball sum, mayby [sic] 25%. I would not expect to pay less than
50%. They will often discount to 2/3. if [sic] they want you to pay more
31
than 75% ask for the person’s supervisor.” The website for the American
Academy of Family Physicians goes so far as to recommend negotiating
payment plans with hospitals and doctors. In a section of their web page
entitled “Financial Management During Crisis,” the AAFP recommends,
As soon as possible, call doctors’ offices, billing departments, hospital
business offices, creditors, and lending institutions to explain the change in
your family’s situation. Most people are willing to work with you, but they
won’t know that you need help unless you tell them.
....
Creditors can be lenient—arranging payment schedules, accepting
partial payments, and so on—but they need to hear from you. Even if you
can only make a portion of a payment, it will show an attempt to keep up
32
your side of the obligation.

In the case of hospital bills, there is systematic survey evidence that confirms the anecdotal evidence of widespread negotiation around standardform payment terms. A Harris Interactive survey shows that while negotiat33
ing over hospital bills is not quite ubiquitous, it is common:

[Question:] “In the last 12 months, have you ever talked to any of the following to see if you could pay a lower price than they had billed you, or
wanted to bill you? [sic]
Base: All adults

30.

The Dollar Stretcher, supra note 27.

31. Id. Another former employee noted, “[Hospitals] don’t want to have to send you to collection—it’s much better for them to get the full amount, even if it takes longer (collection agencies
take a percentage). I’ve seen payment plans as little as $25 a month.” Id.
32. Familydoctor.org, Am. Acad of Family Physicians, Financial Management During Crisis,
http://www.kidshealth.org/PageManager.jsp?dn=familydoctor&lic=44&article_set=21736 (last visited
Nov. 20, 2005).
33. Harris Interactive, “Haggling” with Health Care Providers About Their Prices Likely to
Increase Sharply as Out-of-Pocket Costs Rise (Mar. 6, 2002), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/
news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=443. The questions and charts in the body of this Article are
excerpted directly from the website.
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Health Status
Have
talked to:
Pharmacist
Doctor
Dentist
Hospital

All
Adults
%
17
13
12
10

Excellent
%
10
10
12
7

Pretty
Good
%
18
12
12
9

Only
Fair/
Poor
%
27
20
13
20

....
[Question:] “Were you successful in getting to pay a lower price?”
Base: Talked to (provider) about Medical Bills
Was Successful
%
48
54
47
45

Pharmacist
Doctor
Dentist
Hospital

(As A Percentage of All
Adults)
%
(8)
(7)
(6)
(5)

The polls also showed that if hospital costs continue to rise, many more
34
people would contemplate negotiating over their medical bills:
[Question:] “In the last two years, if the out-of-pocket cost to you of your
medical bills, that is, after whatever your insurance pays for, increases substantially, how likely would you be to negotiate a better price for a medical
bill?”
Base: All adults

Very likely
Likely
Somewhat likely
Not at all likely
Not sure

34.

Id.

All Adults

Excellent

%
32
21
22
12
12

%
33
21
24
16
6

Health Status
Pretty
Only Fair/
Good
Poor
%
%
32
33
21
23
23
16
10
15
15
14
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B. Consumer Credit Cards
The consumer credit-card industry is a foundation of the American
economy, with outstanding revolving credit-card debt standing at over $800
35
billion and over 44% of American families relying on credit-card borrow36
ing to finance purchases. Credit-card contracts are full of terms that
epitomize the pairing of bright-line borrower obligations with discretionary
37
lender forgiveness. A typical credit-card contract grants a grace period during which time balances may be repaid without the borrower incurring the
stated finance charge, and grace periods are typically stated as, for example,
“not less than 20 days,” thus giving the issuer the option to extend the grace
period beyond twenty days. Similarly, the default rate “equals the U.S.
Prime Rate plus up to 23.99%,” with “[f]actors considered in determining”
the default rate including “how long your account has been open, the timing
or seriousness of a default, or other indications of account performance.”
Although there is no preset spending limit, “[e]ach charge that causes your
balance to exceed your revolving credit line will be evaluated based on account usage and performance, other account relationships with us and your
experience with other creditors.” Finally, the contract allows the issuer to
“change the rates, fees, and terms of your account at any time for any reason,” where, controversially, such a reason may include “information in
your credit report, such as your failure to make payments to another creditor
when due, amounts owed to other creditors, the number of credit accounts
38
outstanding, or the number of credit inquiries.” Clearly, in a number of key
terms, the consumer credit-card contract is written with minimal bright-line
borrower guarantees but lots of room for what I have called “tailored forgiveness” by the issuer.
While I have not yet found any systematic empirical data on how often
credit-card issuers renegotiate debt, the existing informal and anecdotal evidence suggests that this practice is common. A raft of best-seller books on
consumer finances recommend negotiating around credit-card contract
terms including the interest rate, annual fee, late payment fee, payment

35. This figure reflects total outstanding revolving debt as of January 2005. Fed. Reserve,
Consumer Credit: January 2005, Fed. Res. Stat. Release, Mar. 7, 2005, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/20050307/g19.pdf.
36. As reported in the most recently available Survey of Consumer Finances. See Anna M.
Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey
of Consumer Finances, 89 Fed. Res. Bull. 1, 24 (2003).
37. The examples used here are the terms, available online, of the Citi Gold/AAdvantage
World Mastercard. See Citi Cards Products, Terms and Conditions, http://www.citibank.com/
us/cards/cardserv/worldcard/gold.jsp (follow “Terms & Conditions” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 20,
2005).
38. Id. The so-called “universal default” provision has recently come under intense criticism
from consumer groups and some members of Congress, and the Comptroller of the Currency has
issued an advisory letter calling for more transparent disclosure of the universal default term. See
Andrew Blackman, Personal Business: Universal Default Can Snare Cardholders, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 20, 2005, at 4; Linda Punch, Getting Tough?, Credit Card Mgmt., Feb. 2005, at 42.
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39

moratoria, and repayment schedules. The frequency with which repayment
obligations are renegotiated is perhaps most strongly evidenced by the fact
that repayment negotiation—consumer credit-card “workouts”—has been
prominent among several credit-card industry practices that have recently
been under very high-level regulatory scrutiny. In July of 2002, the four federal regulatory agencies with jurisdiction over credit-card issuers put out a
draft “Account Management and Loss Allowance Guidance” (“Draft Guid40
ance”). This document criticized credit-card companies for a variety of
practices that extended credit to borrowers beyond the borrowers’ ability to
pay, increasing creditor risk exposure to very high levels. The Draft Guidance criticized credit-card issuers for issuing borrowers too many cards and
too liberally allowing borrowers to exceed their credit-line limits. It also
criticized the way that issuers were handling their “workout” programs, programs set up to allow borrowers to pay off the outstanding balances on
formerly open-ended (and now closed) credit cards. As noted in the Draft
Guidance, workouts are used “when a customer is either unwilling or unable
to repay the open-end credit card account in accordance with its original
terms, but shows the willingness and ability to repay the loan in accordance
41
with its modified terms and conditions.” The Draft Guidance criticized
credit-card issuers’ workout programs for not reducing interest rates, fees,
and finance charges sufficiently to allow borrowers to extinguish their debts
42
within “reasonable time frames.” The Draft Guidance urged that since consumer credit counseling services typically try to get borrowers to repay
credit-card debt within forty-eight months, credit-card lenders should reduce
or eliminate interest rates and fees so that repayment terms for workout programs were also “generally” forty-eight months, “with exceptions clearly
documented and supported by compelling evidence that less conservative
43
terms and conditions are warranted.”

39. See, e.g., Beth Kobliner, Get a Financial Life: Personal Finance in Your Twenties and Thirties 62 (2000) (encouraging negotiation with credit-card issuers for lower rates);
Suze Orman, The Money Book for the Young, Fabulous & Broke 88–89 (2005) (encourages
using the threat of transfer to get a lower credit-card rate); Steven Strauss & Azriela Jaffe, The
Complete Idiot’s Guide to Beating Debt 81–90 (2000) (an entire chapter on negotiating with
creditors); Eric Tyson, Personal Finance for Dummies 76 (4th ed. 2003) (encouraging negotiation with creditors).
40. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., Credit Card Lending (2002) (draft guidance) [hereinafter Draft Guidance], available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/48908.pdf. The
final version is now available. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., Credit
Card Lending (2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/2003-1a.pdf.
41.

Draft Guidance, supra note 40, at 3 n.1.

42.

Id. at 3.

43.

More precisely, the Draft Guidance stated:

Workout programs should be designed to maximize principal reduction. Debt management plans developed by consumer credit counseling services generally strive to have
borrowers repay credit card debt within 48 months. Repayment terms for workout programs should be generally consistent with these time frames, with exceptions clearly
documented and supported by compelling evidence that less conservative terms and conditions are warranted. To meet these time frames, institutions may need to substantially
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Credit-card issuers responded almost immediately to the Draft Guidance. They correctly noted that it was essentially calling for a dramatic
change in credit-issuer operations, from one focused on “portfolio review
and management of the millions of consumer loans . . . to an increasing su44
pervisory review of individual loans.”
Issuers complained that, even as they seemed to require such costly individualized management of millions of consumer loans, financial
institution examiners would interpret the Draft Guidance’s recommendations as bright-line rules barring over-limit authorizations under any
circumstances and requiring repayment of borrower workouts within forty45
eight days. Their existing policy of offering over-limit authorizations in
certain circumstances was, the issuers claimed, an important customerrelations tool in getting and keeping the business of good, low-credit-risk
customers who occasionally had emergency credit needs that caused them to
exceed their limits. Without such discretionary over-limit authorizations,
issuers would need to grant higher initial credit lines or else risk losing their
46
best, lowest risk customers. Similarly, the issuers argued against a brightline forty-eight month repayment period in workouts, and in favor of a “reasonable and prudent timeframe[]” that would retain issuer discretion to
47
“address each consumer’s individual needs and circumstances.” The majority of consumers in debt-workout programs could not repay their
outstanding balances within a forty-eight month period, the issuers argued,
so if forty-eight months was made into a mandatory cap on repayment
terms, issuers would have to respond by increasing interest rates and relax48
ing participation standards.
C. Home-Mortgage and Home-Equity Lending
A similar pattern is revealed in home-equity and mortgage lending
workouts. Home-loan workouts typically involve either a repayment plan in
which a borrower in default is allowed to pay back the past-due amount over
time, provided that she resume making contractually required periodic payments, or an actual modification of the loan in which the past-due amount is

reduce or eliminate interest rates and fees so that more of the payment is applied to reduce principal.
Id.
44. Letter from Paul A. Smith, Senior Counsel, Am. Bankers Ass’n, to David D. Gibbons,
Deputy Comptroller for Credit Risk, Office of the Comptroller of Currency, et al. 2
(Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/DC65CE12-B1C7-11D4-AB4A00508B95258D/26583/CreditCardLendingGuidancefinalcmt9230993.pdf; see also Letter on Behalf
of the Financial Services Roundtable (Sept. 23, 2002) (on file with author).
45.

Letter from Paul A. Smith to David G. Gibbons et al., supra note 44, at 4, 5.

46.

Id. at 5.

47.

Id. at 6.

48.

Letter on Behalf of the Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 44, at 2.
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49

repaid over the life of the loan. The adjustable rate mortgages that have,
with low interest rates, made homes affordable to so many also put borrowers at risk for increases in monthly payments of between 50% and 90%,
should interest rates rise, and over the last two years, the number of homeloan workouts nationally has increased from 155,495 over the entire year of
50
2004 to 89,741 in the first quarter of 2005 alone. Online businesses now
51
offer homeowners workout services and advice, and large banks advertise
on their websites that they will explore the full variety of workout strategies
52
before foreclosing. Just as with credit-card debt workouts, the need for
home-loan workouts has seemed most acute with higher risk, subprime
53
loans. Indeed, Fannie Mae, whose statutory mission is to facilitate homeownership by low- and middle-income families, has proclaimed a goal of
working out mortgages with all of its borrowers “who run into trouble on
their mortgages because of some temporary hardship, such as illness or unemployment,” and states that in 2003, it completed workouts on fully one
54
half of all its “troubled” loans. The state of Massachusetts’s Neighborhood
Housing Rehabilitation Loan Program, which has the goal of making homeimprovement loans to low- and moderate-income property owners, states
that “[f]oreclosure should be viewed as a final option, and only when all
other reasonable alternatives have failed,” and has detailed guidelines on
55
types of workout agreements that should be negotiated.

49. See The Federal Housing Administration Single Family Program Property Disposition:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin.
Serv., 105th Cong. (Apr. 1, 1998) (Statement of Michael A. Quinn, Senior Vice President, Credit Loss
Management, Fannie Mae), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/banking/4198quin.htm (last
visited Nov. 20, 2005) (describing home-loan workouts).
50. Terri Cullen, “Workout” to Prevent Home Foreclosures, Real Estate J., July 22, 2005,
http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/mortgages/20050722-cullen.html.
51. See, e.g., Foreclosureaid.com, http://www.foreclosureaid.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2005)
(proclaiming itself the “[l]eading [f]oreclosures [s]ite on the [n]et”); Steven Wolpern, A Basic
Guide to Families Facing Foreclosure, Dollar Stretcher, http://www.stretcher.com/stories/
990517m.cfm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
52. For an example of large lenders’ promises, see Ameriquest Mortgage Co., Ameriquest’s
“Best Practices” Policy, http://www.ameriquestmortgage.com/press.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2005)
(“We want customers to stay in their homes. Specially trained home retention-associates [sic] evaluate all loans before the foreclosure process begins to ensure that a variety of workout options have
been explored. Their sole responsibility is to make home retention strategies work.”), and
Wells Fargo, Responsible Lending for Non-Prime U.S. Real Estate Loans, http://
financial.wellsfargo.com/responsible (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (“We work diligently using our
workout and repayment plans to help bring accounts current and mitigate losses.”).
53.

Wells Fargo, supra note 52.

54. Fannie Mae, Expanding the American Dream Commitment, http://www.fanniemae.com/
initiatives/adc/index.jhtml?p=Initiatives&s=Expanding+the+American+Dream+Commitment (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
55. Neighborhood Hous. Servs., Mass. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Dev., Delinquency
Policies and Procedures Guide, available at http://www.mass.gov/dhcd/components/cs/
1PrgApps/NHS/DelProGd.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2005).
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D. The Rent-to-Own Industry
A final example is provided by the rent-to-own industry. The rent-toown business has grown from its beginnings in the 1960s to become a significant part of the American retailing market, with at least 8,000 stores in
56
the United States generating revenues of over $5 billion. In a typical rentto-own contract, in exchange for paying a monthly or weekly rental fee, a
consumer gets immediate possession of a durable good, such as an electric
appliance, plus delivery, set up, and service without any down payment or
credit check. At the end of each monthly (or weekly) period, the consumer
can return the goods to the store without any further obligation. Consumers
can also obtain ownership of the goods, either by paying rent for a specified
period of time (usually eighteen to twenty-four months) or by making early
payment of a fraction (usually 50–60%) of the remaining lease payments. If
a consumer acquires ownership by making payments over the entire eighteen-to-twenty-four-month term, she will typically have paid two, three or
57
even a higher multiple of retail price.
Consumer advocates have criticized the high prices and other terms of
rent-to-own contracts as exploiting low-income consumers. The industry has
rebutted by arguing that the high prices are necessary to cover the costly
services provided to rent-to-own customers, the cost of allowing consumers
to return the merchandise at any time, and the high risk of doing business
with customers who are poor credit risks and who have provided no down
payment. Consumer advocates have attempted to get federal legislation
passed that would regulate rent-to-own contracts as a form of consumer58
installment contract. Since rent-to-own contracts do give consumers the
option of simply using and then returning the merchandise, they are not contracts in which consumers necessarily acquire title to goods by making
payments over time, and so they are not, strictly-speaking, installment contracts. On the other hand, rent-to-own consumers do have the option of
buying goods over a period of time, and so to this extent, these contracts do
appear to be functionally the same as installment contracts. The hybrid nature of rent-to-own contracts has triggered an empirical debate over the
relative frequency of rent-to-own consumer purchase versus return, with a
2000 Federal Trade Commission study finding that the majority of rent-toown customers intend to and do buy the goods, while studies based on in-

56. James M. Lacko et al., Customer Experience with Rent-to-Own Transactions, 21 J. Pub.
Pol’y & Marketing 126 (2002). The description of the rent-to-own contract that follows is also
drawn from this article.
57. See Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher & Andrew M. Parker, Demand for Rent-to-Own Contracts:
A Behavioral Economic Explanation, 38 J. Econ. Behavior & Org. 199, 201 (1999) (based on
their survey and existing evidence, rent-to-own purchase payments are generally two to four times
the purchase price with an implicit interest rate well over 100%; demand for rent-to-own even at
these prices is a response by low- and moderate-income consumers to income and expense shocks
and also a personal financial management tool to overcome myopic preferences).
58. See Alix M. Freedman, Peddling Dreams: A Marketing Giant Uses Its Sales Prowess to
Profit on Poverty, Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1993, at A1.
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dustry data find that most customers rent but do not buy. State courts in
Minnesota, Wisconsin, and New Jersey have not waited for the empirical
evidence and have simply ruled that rent-to-own transactions in those states
are consumer-credit sales governed by their state consumer-credit-sales
laws. The rent-to-own industry has reacted by introducing federal legislation
that would preempt such state law decisions by declaring that nowhere are
60
rent-to-own transactions a form of consumer-credit sale.
What is most important about rent-to-own contracts for my purposes is
that in the midst of this battle over precisely how and if rent-to-own contracts should be regulated, there are two key points of consensus among
both industry and independent observers: that the vast majority of rent-toown customers are indeed poor or middle-income, but that when consumers
are late in making their rental payments (as have roughly half), the vast majority have felt that the treatment they received in dealing with the late
61
payment situation was either “very good” or “good.” Indeed, a common
practice in the rent-to-own industry is to give store managers the discretion
to forgive renters who fall behind on their payments and to work out repayment plans so as to keep the business of valuable customers.
E. Retail Sales Return Policies
Legally, a consumer’s default contract with a retail seller is caveat emptor, and the customer has no right to return items for a refund of the
62
purchase price. However, the vast majority of large retailers have varied the
default by adopting a standard-form policy that grants consumers a right of
return. Until recently, retailers also generally granted their on-the-ground
59. Compare James M. Lacko et al., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Survey of Rent-to-Own
Customers (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/renttoown/renttoownr.pdf; Lacko et. al.,
supra note 56; and Signe-Mary McKernan et al., Empirical Evidence on the Determinants of Rentto-Own Use and Purchase Behavior, 17 Econ. Dev. Q. 22 (2003); with Michael H. Anderson &
Raymond Jackson, A Consideration of Rent-to-Own, 35 J. Consumer Affairs 295 (2001), and
Michael H. Anderson & Raymond Jackson, Rent-to-Own Agreements: Purchases or Rentals? (U.
Mass. Dartmouth, 2003), available at http://www.apro-rto.com/legalchannel/pdfs/studies/
JABR_paper.pdf.
60. For a discussion of the state decisions and proposed federal legislation, see Ed Winn III,
Capitol Steps, Progressive Rentals, July-Aug. 2004, at 31; Ed Winn III, States vs. Feds: Preemption Demystified, Progressive Rentals, May-June, 2003, at 46; and Ed Winn III, The Hill is Alive
with the Sound of RTO, Progressive Rentals, July-Aug. 2002, at 35.
61. See Lacko et al., supra note 56, at 133; McKernan et. al., supra note 59, at 34. Thus it
would be a grave error to take the furniture company in Williams v. Walker Thomas Funiture Co.—
which had filed close to one hundred writs of replevin each year for a decade prior to that litigation,
Eben Colby, What did the Doctrine of Unconscionability do to the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company?, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 625, 656 (2002)—as representative of the average rent-to-own firm today.
This is yet another instance of the well-known unrepresentativeness of legal disputes that generate
published appellate opinions, and a caution against basing legal reforms on the very unusual facts of
such disputes.
62. In New York, for example, retail stores may establish and enforce a no-cash and nocredit-card refund policy, but the retailer must announce its policy with “conspicuous signs” visible
from each cash register or from the store entrance for the policy to be enforceable under state consumer protection statutes. See Baker v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 673 N.Y.S.2d 281, 283
(N.Y. City Ct. 1998).
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employees vast amounts of discretion in liberalizing their official return
policies so as to please consumers. So much discretion, however, that opportunistic consumers were taking advantage of the liberal return policies to
obtain free product rentals. Retail-return policies thus not only dramatically
illustrate the reality and significance of two-part standard-form contracts,
but also how the profitability of such contracts depends crucially upon the
ability of employees to screen for consumer type.
Return policies appear to run the gamut, both in whether they impose return costs and processing fees on the consumer and in time limits and
product restrictions (for example, returns may be allowed only if product
63
packaging is unopened). Wal-Mart has a “satisfaction guaranteed” policy
that allows consumers to return anything at virtually anytime, with or without receipt, and get back the full amount of purchase, while Saks Fifth
Avenue has a policy granting a full refund of the purchase price only if the
item is returned within sixty days in a “saleable condition” with proof of
64
purchase. Official return policies are not easy to enforce, however, and as
actually implemented by on-the-ground employees, many retailers’ official
return policies have become ones of “liberal and almost unlimited returns,”
65
with consumers often given a full refund even without proof of purchase.
So liberal have return policies become that in the consumer electronics area,
over seventy percent of products returned were found to have “no significant
66
defect.”
Return policies clearly and dramatically illustrate both the advantages
and disadvantages of the firm strategy of giving employees the discretion to
expand upon standard-form customer rights. Even though a consumer may
67
have no idea what a retailer’s formal return policy may be, consumers
clearly like liberal return practices such as allowing long return periods, giving cash rather than just store credit, and allowing for the return even of sale
68
items. A recent poll found that 91% of customers considered return policies and processes as very important to their decision about where to make a
69
70
purchase (though only about 25% of customers make returns at all). Lib63. Stacy L. Wood, Remote Purchase Environments: The Influence of Return Policy Leniency
on Two-Stage Decision Processes, 38 J. Mktg. Res. 157, 159 (2001).
64. See Charles Passy, Cranky Consumer: Get Set for Many Unhappy Returns, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 12, 2002, at D2; see also Lisa Kalis, Catalog Critic: Bathrobes Get the Spa Treatment, Wall
St. J., Aug. 20, 2004, at W4 (reviewing sellers of high-end, spa-quality bathrobes whose return
periods vary from thirty to ninety days).
65.

Tony Sciarrotta, How Philips Reduced Returns, 7 Supply Chain Mgmt. Rev. 32, 33 (2003).

66.

Id.

67. Id. at 36 (discussing new policies by retailers, such as posting their return policy in plain
sight of consumers).
68.

Wood, supra note 63, at 157.

69. See Evan Schuman, The War Against Retail Return Abuses, eWeek, Dec. 17, 2004,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1743671,00.asp; see also Michele Chandler, Retail Return
Fraud Wearing Thin: Technology Helps Weed Out Abusers, Messenger-Inquirer, Mar. 13, 2005,
http://www.messenger-inquirer.com/features/business/8207494.htm.
70.

Schuman, supra note 69.
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eral returns are thus a way for retailers to keep consumers happy, thereby
72
generating repeat business and positive word-of-mouth.
Liberal returns practices are also, however, subject to abuse by opportunistic consumers who “buy,” use and then return a product, thus obtaining
73
what is essentially a free product rental. Such consumer abuse is hugely
costly not only to retailers, but also to product manufacturers, who end up
stuck with products that are not defective and whose secondary market value
74
is only a fraction of product cost. To reduce such customer abuse, retailers
have recently undertaken measures to both identify and refuse return requests by opportunistic consumers and to limit employee discretion in
granting returns. Retailers such as Kmart and Target have started to strictly
enforce their standard-form policy of granting returns within the specified
75
return period and only if the customer has the product receipt. Retailers
have begun to implement point-of-sale information systems that allow them
76
to quickly identify repeat returners. A company called The Return Ex77
change has created a Windows-based SQL-Server database that creates
customized rules to identify customers whose buying patterns make them
look like return abusers. The system works as follows: when a customer
attempts to return a product, the clerk asks for identification and enters that
information (via the magnetic stripe on drivers’ licenses) into a companywide system. The data is automatically sent to The Return Exchange’s
server. The profile of a potential return abuser is based on complicated algorithms that are customized for each client, and is based on characteristics
like time, duration, dollar amount, and frequency of return behavior. If the
78
database spots abuse, it will send back a signal denying the return. The
technology is being used by Guess, Express, Sports Authority, Staples, and
71. There has long been clear evidence that firms generally respond to consumers’ product
complaints in ways that consumers consider to be satisfactory. See Jean Braucher, An Informal
Resolution Model of Consumer Product Warranty Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1405, 1447–57. For more
formal models of how firms use return policies to lower the consumer’s risk of buying a defective
product and thereby keep the business of high value, repeat consumers, see Yeon-Koo Che, Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods, 44 J. Indus. Econ. 17 (1996) and Claes Fornell &
Birger Wernerfelt, A Model for Customer Complaint Management, 7 Market. Sci. 287 (1988).
72. For evidence on how customer satisfaction generally leads to repeat business and positive
word-of-mouth communications, see Amy Wong & Amrik Sohal, A Critical Incident Approach to
the Examination of Customer Relationship Management in a Retail Chain: An Exploratory Study, 6
Qual. Mkt. Res. 248, 249 (2003).
73.

See sources cited supra note 66.

74. See Sciarrotta, supra note 65, at 33 (recounting how on DVDs sold at liquidators, Philips
was recovering only 20 to 30 cents per dollar of factory costs). My focus here is on retailer-return
policies, but those policies are of course directly affected by manufacturer-return policies. There is a
quite substantial theoretical literature demonstrating how, by accepting retailer returns, a manufacturer lowers retailer risk and can induce retailers to more truthfully reveal information about the
actual strength of consumer product demand. See, e.g., Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf, Using Return
Policies to Elicit Retailer Information, 35 Rand J. Econ. 617 (2004).
75.

Sciarrotta, supra note 65, at 36.

76.

Id. at 37.

77.

The Return Exchange, http://www.returnexchange.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).

78.

Schuman, supra note 69.
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79

KB Toys. At the end of the day, says The Retail Exchange, it rejects only
80
one-tenth of one percent of all the reviewed returns.
While as I explain in more detail below, the way that stores have responded to return policy abuse makes consumers better off—by generating
lower prices and better service—like other negotiating practices, it has become a target for regulation. Senator Schumer of New York has argued that
the practice amounts to blacklisting customers who return “a bit too much,”
and is proposing to restrict the practice or make stores state the qualifica81
tions for “blacklisting” up front. It is also being criticized and tracked by
82
privacy rights groups.
F. Only the Tip of the Iceberg: Can Everything Be Renegotiated?
The standard-form contracting situations that I have discussed above are
those where there is at least some systematic evidence for the frequency of
the two-part standard-form contract. The practice is, however, almost surely
not confined to these particular industries or transactions. Most consumer
goods are sold on a fixed- or posted-price basis, and it is typically assumed
by legal scholars that consumers do not negotiate over price. Yet there is
clear evidence that during economic recessions, sharp consumers recognize
and seize the opportunity to bargain over price and payment terms (cash
83
versus credit) for consumer durables. A fascinating recent journalistic experiment, moreover, indicates that bargaining around standard-form terms
84
and policies may be a very general and widespread possibility. For three
months, freelance journalist Tom Chiarella attempted to negotiate over price
and terms on every transaction he engaged in, from the smallest—buying a
hot dog from a street vendor—to the largest—replacing a lost remote rental
car key that was originally supposed to cost $1200 to replace. What
Chiarella found was that while some prices are indeed fixed, other terms—
such as the $1200 cost replacing the remote automobile key—can be negotiated. Indeed, by working his way up the managerial chain, and eventually
reaching the regional manager, he succeeded not only in avoiding the $1200
replacement cost but in getting a two-week rental for free. While obviously
anecdotal, this journalistic experience dramatically depicts bargaining
around standard-form terms and policies: by incurring the costs of negotiating, the consumer eventually reaches an employee with the discretion to

79.

Chandler, supra note 69.

80.

Schuman, supra note 69.

81.

Id.

82. See, e.g., Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Alert: The Return Exchange—Have You Been
Denied the Ability to Make Returns or Exchanges with Large Retailers? We Want to Know (Nov.
17, 2004), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ReturnExchange.htm.
83. Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Let’s Make a Deal: A Buyer’s Market Has Shoppers Demanding
and Getting Discounts, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1991, at A1.
84. Tom Chiarella, Haggling for Hot Dogs (and Other Real-Life Adventures in the Neglected
Art of Negotiation), Esquire, Feb. 2005, at 115.
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decide that the consumer’s loyalty and future business is sufficiently valuable that a departure from standard terms is in the firm’s economic interest.
III. Explaining Observed Behavior: Designing StandardForm Terms that Are Meant to Be Forgiven
In all of the empirical examples, a business uses a standard-form contract that establishes a clear, bright-line obligation, but the business gives its
supervisory employees the discretion to do more for the customer than the
standard-form obligations require. A very strong economic logic motivates
this very common contracting practice: the desire of firms to maximize not
only short-term profits, but also long-term value.
Growing earnings over time requires either continually decreasing costs
and/or continually increasing revenues. On the revenue side, growth comes
from increasing sales, either by getting existing customers to buy more or by
attracting new customers. While decreasing the price of a product or service
is sometimes crucial to growing revenues, for firms who produce differentiated products and services (which is by far and away most firms), the real
key to growing revenues is to continually improve the quality of the product
or service they offer, and to do so in a way that attracts new customers while
not causing the loss or defection of existing customers. The strategy of allowing employees the discretion to grant case-specific benefits beyond those
that are required by the standard-form contract can be seen to be a sophisticated way for the firm to grow its revenues by gaining the loyalty of existing
customers and establishing a good reputation that will attract new customers. There are in fact two slightly different aspects to this strategy. These are
captured by the examples set out earlier, which actually comprise two different situations. In the first, the good or service provided was not up to the
customer’s expectation, and the customer complains seeking some kind of
compensation from the provider. I shall refer to this as the strategy of awarding discretionary benefits. In the second type of case, the customer has not
lived up to her obligations under the standard-form contract, but the provider forgives her technical breach and renegotiates. I shall refer to this as
85
the strategy of discretionary forgiveness.
85. There is an interesting contrast between the pattern that I explain in this section—one
where firms intentionally adopt relatively clear, bright-line standard-form terms which they intend to
bargain around—and the pattern that Bernstein found in the cotton industry, where cotton merchants
and traders work out their problems cooperatively subject to bright-line industry trade rules. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1732–35, 1776–81. Unlike Bernstein’s cotton-industry norms, which are
driven by the desire of industry participants to develop and maintain good reputations for efficiently
performing and resolving disputes, the incentive for firms to negotiate around bright-line terms is
driven by the desire to attract some kinds of consumers and to avoid others, a more precise screening function than is apparent in Bernstein’s study of the cotton industry. There are some similarities
between my analysis and that presented by Bebchuk and Posner in this volume, and I note these at
various points below. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, 104 Mich. L. Rev 827 (2006). Gilo and Porat believe, as do Bebchuk and Posner and I, that standard-form contracts are important instruments for firms to screen or select
different consumer types, but they believe, contrary in my view to the existing evidence, that standard-form terms themselves confer precise benefits on consumers who have the sophistication to
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A. Discretionary Forgiveness as Ex-post Customer Screening
The key to understanding why a firm can benefit by allowing its employees to forgive some customers’ contract breaches lies in the recognition
that not all existing customers are worth keeping. Some consumers are honest, some are not. Some consumers have a highly secure economic base and
ability to pay, while others have jobs and income flows that are much more
uncertain. An opportunistic consumer who really wants a new coat may deliberately damage the coat if she thinks that she’ll get a discount that makes
the coat affordable by so doing; an honest consumer may unknowingly select a damaged coat from the rack. A naïve consumer may run up enormous
credit-card bills and be surprised to learn that she has accumulated a repayment obligation that she cannot carry; a more sophisticated (and wealthier)
consumer may use her credit card only for the convenience of cashless
monthly interest-free loans. An honest patient may fully expect to pay her
hospital bills but lose her job; an opportunistic patient may demand a medical procedure today, even though she knows that she cannot pay for it.
A firm interested in steadily growing its earnings will seek to build and
maintain relationships with good customers and to avoid or terminate relationships with bad customers. It will seek, in other words, to build a loyal
86
and profitable customer base. As the credit-card companies stated in their
trade association’s formal response to the 2002 Draft Guidance, the overriding business goal of consumer lenders is to build and retain a profitable,
long-term relationship, and the best way to do so is to get customers “back
87
on track with a repayment agreement with a low probability of default.”
The strategy of adopting bright-line standard-form terms and then granting discretionary forgiveness allows businesses to identify or screen for
good, high-value customers under circumstances when they could not do so
with the contract term itself. To see why this is so, consider the very important example of repayment terms. Lenders and creditors more generally
renegotiate these when their employees have determined that there is a good
reason for the borrower’s failure to make timely payment. A “good” reason
is something beyond the borrower’s control, such as an illness or loss of a
job (or for a business, a sudden downturn in market conditions). A borrower
who has fallen behind only because of such an unusual and extraordinary
event is a valuable customer, someone who is basically a very good credit
risk and on whom the lender will on average make money.
read them, so that standard-form terms are themselves used to screen consumers. David Gilo &
Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate in Standard-Form Contracts, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 983
(2006). In my model, precisely the opposite is true: standard-form terms offer little, and firms then
allow their employees to exercise discretion in identifying those consumers with respect to whom it
is profitable to go beyond standard-form obligations.
86
For empirical evidence that it is indeed those firms with large fixed capital and hence a
large stake in building enduring customer relationships who are most interested in minimizing and
responding cooperatively to customer complaints, see Sharon Oster, The Determinants of Consumer
Complaints, 62 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 603 (1980).
87. Ken Maynard, Customer Service: The Key to Collection Success, Credit Mgmt., Oct.
2003, at 44.
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A lender can successfully screen for such “good” types by setting clear
standard-form terms that are sometimes waived (or not enforced) when it
could not do so by using a simple standard-form contract without renegotiation. Suppose, for instance, that the lender eliminated its managers’
discretion to forgive and altered the standard-form terms to require a shorter
repayment period and/or a higher interest rate. By demanding such harsh
terms up front, in the standard-form contract, the lender would lose the
business of “good,” lower-income borrowers who will keep their promises
to make timely repayments while doing nothing to lose the business of
“bad,” opportunistic borrowers who borrow with no intention of repaying on
schedule. By the same reasoning, we can see the tradeoff that the lender
confronts in arriving at the optimum, profit-maximizing combination of
standard-form terms and discretionary forgiveness. On the one hand, the
lower the standard-form interest rate and the longer the standard-form repayment period, the greater the number of good, honest borrowers who sign
on and the lower the probability of costly, forgiving renegotiation with such
borrowers. On the other hand, a lower interest rate and longer repayment
period mean lower revenues from such borrowers. Conversely, were the
lender to raise the interest rate and shorten the repayment period, it would
increase revenues from good borrowers, but also decrease the proportion of
good borrowers and increase the probability of costly renegotiation with
88
good borrowers. The optimal terms result from solving this trade-off.
What necessitates the two-part contract—clear standard-form terms plus
managerial discretion to renegotiate—is a fundamental economic problem
89
known as adverse selection (or hidden information). Adverse selection refers to the problem of designing a contract when the contract may attract
different types of contracting parties—some honest, some opportunistic, for
example—who bring correspondingly different costs and benefits to the
relationship. Tailored forgiveness deals with the problem of hidden customer
types. In dealing with the hidden type problem, tailored forgiveness is a substitute for ex-ante screening. That is, a firm that has tough standard-form
terms and then delegates discretion to renegotiate when its managers believe
that the customer has not behaved opportunistically does not have to worry
so much about identifying opportunistic types before entering the contract.
If it turns out that the customer behavior was indeed opportunistic, its manager will insist upon adherence to the unforgiving standard-form terms.
More concretely, under the two-part contract—standard-form terms plus
discretionary forgiveness—a seller does not need to rely upon price and
other standard-form terms to screen buyer types, and these terms will generally be more generous to the buyer than they would if the seller was denied
the discretion to renegotiate. A lender, for example, will set a lower stated
interest rate and more generous repayment terms than it would if denied the

88.

This result is demonstrated in the appendix. See infra App.

89. This important general result is due to Joseph Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing
in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 393 (1981).
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legal ability to use its discretion to forgive breach of the standard-form
90
terms.
Interestingly, although economists have recognized the adverse selection
problem confronting creditors and other providers of consumer goods and
services, they have failed to discuss two-part contracts as a market solution
to this problem. Rather than ex-post forgiving renegotiation, economists
have focused on ex-ante mechanisms that creditors use to screen out bad
credit risks, such as requiring collateral, or lending only to consumers with
whom they have had ongoing personal contact (referred to generally in the
91
lending context as “credit rationing”). Compared with ex-post renegotiation, such ex-ante screening has the disadvantage of making it hard for
“new” consumers—those without an established reputation—to obtain
credit. Rather than screening ex ante on the basis of wealth or relationship,
two-part contracts in effect say, “we do not know you, but we will give you
a chance.” In this light, it is clear that two-part contracts serve a very important social as well as economic function: they make it economically rational
for creditors and other providers to do business with consumers who, because of their age, ethnicity or nationality, have not yet had an opportunity
to establish either accumulated wealth or valuable personal relationships.
B. Individualized versus Algorithmic Renegotiation
In the several empirically important examples discussed above, the seller
or lender does not incur the high cost of having its employees individually
renegotiate forgiveness, but rather relies upon general rules of thumb or algorithms that all employees use in determining whether or not to forgive
breach. Indeed, the credit-card industry, in its highly negative reaction to
recent regulatory guidance, complained that the guidance both required
costly individualized renegotiations while also seeming to set up bright-line
rules for the terms of those negotiations (such as requiring that repayments
92
be made within forty-eight months).
On my analysis, there is no reason for regulators to insist upon such individualized bargaining at the forgiveness stage of a two-part standard-form
contract. After all, a seller or lender is using the second stage to determine
whether or not the buyer or borrower is or is not worth keeping as a customer. The entire point of the two-part contract is to efficiently get
information about a buyer or borrower type, and efficiency in information
acquisition necessarily involves a trade-off between accuracy and cost. From
90. Note that even if firms are able to quite accurately assess consumer type at the negotiation stage, it may be that courts are unable to verify consumer type. This problem—types are
privately observable but not verifiable to third party enforcers—is a standard law-and-economics
explanation for contractual incompleteness. I discuss in some detail below the limits to judicial
verification of both consumer and firm opportunism, but my basic approach is to presume that consumer opportunism is not verifiable and so firms have to solve it on their own.
91. See, for example, DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC:
THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 104-05 (2d ed. 2005).
92.

See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
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the evidence discussed earlier, providers that have a relatively small number
of accounts to manage—such as hospitals—seem to find it economic to en93
gage in a more individualized forgiveness renegotiation than do
providers—such as credit-card issuers—who have millions of accounts and
rely upon generalized algorithms that, for instance, extend additional credit
94
x number of times automatically. In reasonably competitive markets, the
lower the cost of forgiveness, the better off both the provider and its consumer clients are.
Were regulators to make it too costly for providers to engage in ex-post
forgiveness, they might well make the two-part contract uneconomic for
providers. As just argued, if restricted to a one-part contract in which only
price and other standard-form terms may be used to screen customer types,
it is on my analysis very likely that providers would increase price and
toughen payment terms. Thus as the credit-card issuers argued, adoption of
regulations that make forgiveness of late or inadequate payments too costly
would indeed likely cause a “number” of institutions to stop making new
credit loans to subprime borrowers, thus restricting credit availability to
95
many low- and moderate-income families.
C. Discretionary Benefits and the Potential Instability of Consumer
Screening through Two-Part Standard-Form Contracts
Another version of the two-part contract involves the awarding of discretionary ex-post customer benefits. For many firms, the most important type
of customer to keep happy is the customer who is relatively knowledgeable,
persuasive, and strategic—a sharp bargainer. Such customers are likely to be
a lucrative source of repeat business if they remain satisfied with the firm’s
services. By the same token, if they terminate their relationships with the
firm because they are dissatisfied with the quality of the firm’s services, they
are likely to be an especially influential source of negative word-of-mouth
advertising. Such customers are also more likely to complain than is the
typical customer. The strategy of allowing its employees to respond to such
complaints with various forms of compensatory benefits is a costminimizing way for the firm to increase the probability that it will keep the
business of such consumers. By waiting for the consumer to make the first
move—by complaining—the company effectively lets the high-value, highinformation consumers identify themselves. That is, the consumers who will
complain most often and loudest are presumably those who are most inconvenienced by the failure of the product or service to meet their expectations.
Other consumers may not even be aware of the possibility of obtaining
relief by complaining to the company. Rather than seeking out customer

93.

See supra Part II.A.

94.

See supra Part II.B.

95.

Letter on behalf of the Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 44, at 2.
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complaints, a policy of awarding complaint-based benefits allows the company to satisfy those consumers who are most demanding.
Under the economic terminology introduced above, awarding complaint-based benefits is a strategy to deal with the hidden type problem that
the firm faces when customers differ in their sophistication and in the value
they attach to the firm’s performance. Simply put, the firm would like to
attract and keep the business of high-value, high-sophistication customers
without giving every customer the same benefits as it gives these high demanders. That is, were the benefits extended to complaining high-value
customers part of the firm’s standard-form package, the firm would have
needlessly increased its costs by offering benefits to lots of customers who
do not expect them and who would buy the firm’s product or service regardless of whether those benefits were offered.
As for the demanding consumers, it is theoretically possible that they
would be better off with a more expensive, higher-quality good or service.
However, when sophisticated, demanding consumers are in a minority and
there are lots of naïve, uncomplaining consumers, then the price of the lower
quality good or service may be low enough so that the sophisticated consumers are better off with the lower quality good (plus complaint-based
compensation when things go wrong), than they would be with the higherquality, higher-price good. When these conditions hold, the complaint-based
benefits strategy not only allows the firm to retain and add sophisticated,
influential customers, but effectively gives those customers a price subsidy
that is paid for by less-well-informed, or simply more acquiescent, consum96
ers.
By this same token, however, the complaint-based benefits strategy creates an opportunity for new firms to enter and offer the good or service on a
simple one-part contract that offers no discretionary benefits but charges a
97
lower price. Since by hypothesis low-value consumers do not demand discretionary benefits, the simple, low-price contract will give them the same
good or service as they receive under the two-part contract, but at a lower
price. Hence, such a contract will attract the business of all the low-value
consumers. The entry into the market of low-price, “no-frills” providers will
destroy the cross-subsidy offered by the two-part contract, and with such
entry, that market may segment into low-price, no-frills providers and highprice, quality providers. In such a segmented equilibrium, there will no
longer be any reason to use bargaining around the standard form, no frills
terms to screen out high-value consumers.

96. To see this, suppose that it costs the firm an amount c to provide the basic good or service, but an extra amount f to provide frills demanded by a high-value type, and let the probability of
a low-value consumer be q, while the probability of high-value-consumer type is then (1 – q). Under
a strategy of granting frills only when the consumer reveals herself to be a high-value type, the
firm’s expected costs, which will equal price, p, under competition, are given by qc + (1 –q)(c + f)
= c + (1 – q)f = p. Hence the price p both above the cost c of servicing low-value consumers and
below the cost (c + f) of servicing high-value consumers.
97. That is, using the notation set out above, supra note 96, a competitive contract of this
form sets p = c.
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In some markets precisely such a phenomenon seems to have occurred.
Higher-cost, higher-price “legacy” airlines such as American Airlines and
Delta have for some time used optional first-class upgrades and other tools
to identify and compensate valuable customers. The Travel Insider reports
that “airlines have become very much more sophisticated in how they handle their first class seats” by using information technology to identify
valuable customers: “with the great deal of information now on [gate]
agents’ computer screens about each individual passenger, the fare they
paid, and their frequent flier status, [airlines now] have set procedures for
98
who gets upgraded first and who gets upgraded last . . . .” Before information was available to gate agents, they “truly could close their eyes and
99
choose passengers, seemingly at random” for upgrades. Now, however,
100
agents “are expected to follow set procedures if/when upgrading for free.”
“Because of these extra procedures and extra information,” continues the
article, “it is much harder for people to get themselves pushed up the upgrade eligibility list unless they have a valid entitlement to enhanced
101
status.”
Such a strategy of discretionary benefits may please high-value frequent
airline travelers, but it provides no benefits to low-value passengers. Following the lead of Southwest Airlines, during the 1990s a number of low-price,
no-frills carriers entered the market and targeted precisely such low-value
passengers. Such carriers offer no discretionary benefits such as upgrades,
but they do offer very low prices. Predictably, they have attracted a large
number of customers and have placed enormous pressure on the pricing
strategies of legacy carriers.
As this example shows, market structure imposes quite definite limits on
the ability of firms to use the two-part standard-form contracting strategy as
a way of screening for high-value customers. Unless there are barriers to
entry, or consumers have very high switching costs, the discretionarybenefits strategy will be undermined by the entry of no-frills, low-price pro102
viders. This analysis thus generates the sharp empirical implication that
98. Free Fist Class Upgrade—Fantasy or Fact?, Travel Insider, Feb. 19, 2005,
http://www.thetravelinsider.info/2003/0228.htm.
99.

Id.

100.

Id.

101. Id. (emphasis added). The article continues, “Almost without exception, if an airline is
going to give away empty first class seats, they will start off with their ‘best’ frequent fliers and/or
the people that paid the highest fares.” Id. Observe that just as providers have an interest in lowering
the transaction costs of discretionary forgiveness, so too do they have an interest in finding algorithms and rules of thumb that effectively and cheaply discriminate among customers in granting
discretionary benefits. As the legacy carriers’ practices illustrate, as computational speed and capacity have increased, the algorithms available to firms for such ex-post screening use increasingly
detailed and accurate customer-specific information. As a consequence, firms can rely on information about customer value that they have directly collected and need rely less on customer
complaints as a signal of customer type.
102. Discretionary benefits are in this important sense quite different than the case of
shrouded costs considered by Gabaix and Laibson. See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded
Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. Econ.
(forthcoming Aug. 2006), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=527.
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the two-part standard-form contracting practice should exhibit long-term
survival only in industries that are relatively noncompetitive.
This does not, however, imply that it is only in such relatively noncompetitive industries that we will observe such a contracting strategy. Even
if undermined from below, as it were, by the entry of no-frills providers, the
discretionary-benefits strategy may have been a valuable, albeit temporary,
instrument for firms. The strategy allows firms to identify and attract highvalue, sophisticated consumers. Hence even if firms using such a strategy
eventually lose their low-value consumers to low-price, no-frills entrants,
the discretionary benefits strategy may well have accelerated growth in firm
size and sales for a number of years, thus increasing the firm’s stock market
value. The two-part strategy will also have given firms lots of information
about high-value consumers, information that firms can use in devising new
price and nonprice strategies designed to keep the business and maximize
revenues from such high-value consumers.
IV. The Value of Discretion: Distributional
Issues in the Regulationof Standard-Form
Contracts and Their Renegotiation
An immediate implication of the preceding analysis is that the effect of
laws or regulations mandating generous standard-form terms would be to
replace a system in which firms extend a wide and trusting invitation and
then enforce standard-form terms only against those whom its on-theground managers have found to have violated that trust, with one in which
firms use only attorney-drafted standard-form terms to control their exposure to contractual risk. Such a move from individualized ex-post screening
to crude ex-ante screening may well harm the very groups—such as generally poorer, economically disadvantaged racial minorities—that it was
designed to help.
On the other hand, mandating that firms offer generous terms in the exante standard-form contract, rather than allowing firms to exercise their discretion in determining when and whether to grant such terms ex post when
problems arise, might well prevent the cross-subsidization of high-value,
sophisticated consumers by low-value, less sophisticated consumers that is
entailed by the discretionary strategy. That is, by mandating generous standard-form terms, the firm’s cost, and hence the competitive price, would
increase.
Such a price increase will almost surely be higher than the increase in
value that any consumer type gets from the mandatory terms. The reason
why this is so is crucial to understand, for it sharply distinguishes this analysis of mandatory standard-form terms from earlier law-and-economics work
on the topic. When the law mandates generous standard-form terms, it is
There, unsophisticated consumers subsidize sophisticated consumers because they pay supracompetitive prices for add-on services that sophisticated consumers avoid, but there is no incentive
for new firms to enter to steal the business of the unsophisticated consumers, because by assumption, the unsophisticated do not realize that they will demand and buy the add-on services.
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possible that it is giving low-value, low-sophistication consumers terms that
they value at more than their cost, but which they did not get under the discretionary strategy because they lack the sophistication, or simple
willingness, to complain and bargain ex post. However, if this is true, then it
would seem that firms would have been better off simply offering and advertising the generous standard-form package in the first place. When,
however, the firm promises all customers these generous terms, it has lost
103
the ability to screen for customer opportunism. Such opportunism is
costly. Hence when the firm sells a standard-form package with all the various benefits and forgiving adjustments that it would otherwise have made on
a discretionary basis under the tough standard-form contract, nonopportunistic customers must pay for the costs of opportunism that the firm can no
longer control. While low-value, low-sophistication customers might indeed
value discretionary benefits at more than they cost the firm when they are
not opportunistically claimed, such customers may well not value the benefits as highly as their cost to the firm when it can no longer control
opportunistic claims. That is, in this model, the firm’s costs are endogenous,
and they are systematically higher when being nice is required, so that the
firm cannot control opportunistic claiming, than when being nice is discretionary, so that it can control such opportunism.
This is to argue that it is very likely that low-value, low-sophistication
customers will be priced out of the market if policies that were discretionary
with the firm become part of the firm’s standard-form obligations. It is true
that when opportunism is not so serious as to price out the low-value, lowsophistication customers, mandating generous standard-form terms may
eliminate the cross-subsidization of high-value, highly sophisticated customers by low-value, low-sophistication customers. All customers may end
up getting the benefits that accrued only to the higher value customers under
the discretionary strategy.
Such a happy outcome is, however, not likely. For one thing, since opportunism becomes a more severe problem under mandatory generous
standard-form terms, the firm will have a very strong incentive to instruct
employees to behave in a non-cooperative fashion when customers bring
complaints by insisting upon very narrow and legalistic interpretations of
the firm’s superficially generous standard-form contractual obligations.
Thus, whereas under the discretionary strategy high-value customers were
met with an ex-post willingness to bargain, they will often encounter precisely the opposite, unreasonable insistence upon narrow interpretations of
standard-form obligations, in the world of mandatory standard-form terms.
This makes it much more likely that the high-value, high-sophistication
types will drop out of the market for the firm’s product or service and switch
their business to a more expensive higher-quality provider, a provider whose
prices are so high that low-value, low-sophistication customers are not part
of the market. In such a case, mandating generous standard-form terms may
induce a kind of adverse selection; as higher-value customers drop out, and
103.

This insight is the basis for the analysis in Bebchuck & Posner, supra note 85, at 87–28.
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the ostensibly generous standard-form terms offered to remaining low-value,
low-sophistication customers are in practice degraded further and further.
All of this analysis, moreover, presumes my conflation of high-value
with high-sophistication. While it may be true that high-income, higheducation customers are the ones who get the benefits of the discretionary104
firm strategy, this is not necessarily the case. It might well be that it is the
middle-income customer who is most familiar with and adept at bargaining
with the firm when something goes wrong with her or the firm’s performance. High sophistication, this to say, may accompany middle or even low
income. If this is so, then the tough standard form combined with discretionary forgiveness strategy may be one which especially benefits customers
who are keen but not wealthy. Indeed, it is precisely such customers, rather
than high-wealth customers, who are likely to be most attracted to the products or services of a firm with relatively low prices and meager standardform promises but which will bargain when things go wrong. By the same
token, it will be such smart but middle-income customers who will be most
harmed by a legal rule mandating generous standard-form terms.
V. Standard-Form Terms and the Doctrinal
Control of Firm Opportunism
A. The Complexity of Opportunism
It may quite aptly be objected that opportunism cuts both ways, that just
as consumers and employees might opportunistically invoke generous standard-form contractual rights, so too might opportunistic firms harshly and
unfairly enforce harsh standard-form clauses. While this is indeed possible,
such behavior would alienate and drive away customers. And if word-ofmouth is indeed as important as many contemporary marketing experts increasingly believe, by unfairly driving away their current customers, such
105
firms would do much to ensure that they do not get future customers.
Thus, while firm opportunism cannot be ruled out as a general theoretical
matter, it seems likely to be a potentially profitable strategy only where the
firm is selling a good or service that consumers buy only very infrequently
and in small quantity, and where the firm makes its sales in widely diffuse
locations that are not part of the same consumer word-of-mouth network.
Still, to call a firm that rigidly enforces the harsh terms of its standardform contracts opportunistic is to strain the meaning of the term. After all,
104. This is similar to the point made by Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal
Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 361, 377–80
(1991) (arguing that if poor consumers attach low value both to a product and to a generous term
such as a warranty, then they may be made worse off when the law mandates such a term, because
high-value consumers drive up the price of the good by a large amount when the warranty is mandated).
105. See Bebchuck & Posner, supra note 85, at 829–30 (presuming that when firms are sensitive to their market reputations, the problem for contract design is in controlling consumer, not firm,
opportunism).
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such a firm is just doing what it has a contractual right to do and is in a
sense a much more straightforward actor than the firm that awards discretionary forgiveness and discretionary benefits. Real firm opportunism would
seem to consist not in being a literalist about form contract rights and obligations, but in creating a false appearance of pursuing a policy of
forgiveness or complaint-based benefits by mimicking the behavior of a firm
that really does implement these strategies. The truly opportunistic firm
would take steps to appear to pursue a nice, forgiving strategy, while eventually reneging on those promises for various technical or legalistic reasons
that are burdensome or impossible for most consumers, even quite sophisticated ones, to sort through. Indeed, a firm might be so successful in
clouding and confusing the consumer as to its employment of such a strategy that even existing customers are not aware of what has happened: they
may actually believe that the firm has a legitimate reason for failing to forgive or to respond to their complaints.
If opportunistic firms are indeed successful in mimicking forgiving
firms, their presence may eventually lower the incentive for firms to be forgiving. This effect is somewhat complex. On the one hand, a legitimately
good firm still pleases and retains its customers, who remain with it and
inform other potential new customers. On the other hand, even a good firm
sometimes fails to forgive (indeed, this is the way that consumer opportunism is disciplined), and opportunistic consumers may spread bad, false news
about good firms, news that is in general credible when there are some opportunistic firms in the overall market mix.
B. Doctrinal Implications
The possibility of good and bad types on both sides of the firmconsumer divide raises an obvious question about the potential for laws and
regulations to improve the performance of two-part standard-form contracts.
My general answer to this question is that courts should support the standard-form, discretionary benefits/forgiveness market equilibrium. To get
more precise prescriptions for judicial action (or inaction), the key thing to
see about the market equilibrium is that in it, while all firms have very
strong incentives to actually discipline customer opportunism, only those
firms that are long-run players in the game and really seek to build lasting
customer relationships have an incentive to actually confer discretionary
benefits beyond what they have promised in their form contracts.
For firms that are opportunistic short-run players, the second stage is too
costly. Such opportunistic firms will instead rely upon the standard-form
terms themselves to extract consumer rents, setting up standard-form terms
that are onerous and then refusing to renegotiate them at all, or fraudulently
promising but then failing to forgive. Indeed, and most seriously for the viability of socially desirable market equilibrium in two-part contracts, if
firms could renege on promises to be forgiving of customer breach or to
extend benefits to rectify customer disappointment with their own performance failures without customers actually being able to determine whether
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the firm in fact has a valid legal reason for so doing, to in effect shroud their
failures in complex legalese, then all firms would have an incentive to pursue such a highly opportunistic strategy. The market equilibrium posited
above would then unbundle.
It is, unfortunately, far from clear that courts can do much to prevent
such firm opportunism. One’s first thought might well be that courts could
reduce firm opportunism by holding firms to their agents’ ex-post (that
is, after the standard-form contract has been made) promises offering
discretionary forgiveness or complaint-based benefits. Somewhat unconventionally, the crucial legal doctrines in implementing this role are not those—
such as the unconscionability doctrine considered below—that get at
whether the standard-form contract was itself in some sense fairly bargained
for. They are instead doctrines governing the enforceability of relatively
informal promises made apart from or in the process of renegotiating the
standard-form contract. Candidate doctrines would include those determining the enforceability of an express warranty made outside a standard-form
contract that by its terms excludes any such warranties and the enforceability of an oral modification of a standard-form contract that by its terms
precludes any such oral modification.
It is possible that through such doctrines, courts could increase the cost
to opportunistic firms of inducing consumers to make more payments by
promising but failing to deliver discretionary benefits or forgiveness. But
106
there are opportunistic consumers as well as firms. After all, the whole
point of the strategy of discretionary benefits/forgiveness is to screen for
opportunistic consumer types. Such opportunistic consumers are the ones to
whom the firm will not promise forgiveness or extra benefits. But they are
precisely the ones who will file lawsuits claiming that such promises were
made when they in fact were not. If courts are prone to making errors in
determining whether such promises were made, and in particular have a
high probability of a false positive (finding a promise was made when one
was not), then they increase the incentive for such opportunistic, bad-faith
lawsuits. Substantive legal rules strongly impact the likelihood of such errors. The legal fact-finder may well interpret evidence that the defendant
firm has a general practice of giving its agents the discretion to forgive the
breach of or go beyond promises contained in the standard-form contract as
indicating that its agents did precisely that in this particular instance. Hence
contract-law rules that presume that the terms of a present contract are affected by prior course of dealing or past performance tend to facilitate
plaintiff opportunism and raise the risk that a defendant firm will be erroneously held liable for a forgiving promise that it never made. If sufficiently
likely, such erroneous ex-post liability may increase the cost to the firm of
106. The importance of two-sided opportunism and opportunistic, bad-faith lawsuits cannot
be overestimated. For an analytical treatment of two-sided opportunism and a discussion of how the
possibility of bad-faith, opportunistic lawsuits figures in neoclassical economic analysis of the
proper scope of legal rules protecting against contractual opportunism, see Jason Scott Johnston,
Opting in and Opting out: Bargaining for Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures, 70 Wash. U.
L.Q. 291, 301–08 (1992).
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pursuing two-part standard-form contracts by so much that firms no longer
allow discretionary forgiveness/benefits, thus destroying what is in general a
socially desirable market outcome.
This argument recommends that if courts are to get into the business of
enforcing promises of discretionary forgiveness/benefits that are made after
and go beyond standard-form obligations, then they should do so only if
there is very strong evidence that the promise was in fact made. As I read
the central cases, while some courts have followed this recommendation,
others have been, if anything, too cautious in enforcing such promises. My
analysis suggests that with sufficient evidentiary safeguards, oral misrepresentations by a firm’s agent that deviate from standard-form contract terms
are a form of opportunistic exploitation that should be deemed fraudulent
and hence should constitute grounds for rescinding a contract. State high
courts, however, appear to be split on the issue of whether general standard107
form merger clauses and/or language that disclaims reliance on oral representations bar actions for fraud claiming that oral representations by the
108
firm’s agents in fact induced such reliance. On my analysis, provided that
the proof standard is sufficiently high, standard-form disclaimers and
merger clauses should not bar proof that such oral representations were indeed made. Such an approach is precisely what courts have taken in dealing
with a closely related issue, the enforceability of oral agreements modifying
written standard-form contracts that by their terms prohibit oral modifica109
tion. Here the courts have held that while detrimental reliance or partial
performance may make enforceable an oral promise modifying obligations
in a standard-form contract that precludes such modification unless in writing, such reliance or performance must be “unequivocally referable” to the
oral modifying promise and must not be “compatible” with the original
110
agreement.
107. Calling the situation on this particular issue a “split” may be going too far, as even the
strongest judicial statement in favor of holding that a merger clause bars evidence of fraud, UAWGM Human Res. Ctr. v. KSL Recreation Corp., 579 N.W.2d 411 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998), has already
been subject to the limiting interpretation that it is inapplicable to frauds that allegedly nullify assent
to an entire contract, as opposed to assent to a particular term. See Star Ins. Co. v. United Commercial Ins. Agency, 392 F. Supp. 2d 927, 928-29 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
108. Compare Van Der Stok v. Van Voorhees, 866 A.2d 972, 975–76 (N.H. 2005), and Snyder
v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1084–85 (Wyo. 1999), with Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157
N.E.2d 597, 599 (N.Y. 1959).
109. It is tautologically true that oral promises modifying a standard-form contract are made
after oral promises or representations that are made before the individual has actually entered into
the contract. It is true that the evidence I discuss above pertains almost entirely to post-contractual
renegotiation by such agents. However, on my analysis, what is crucial is that firms screen customers by giving their agents the discretion to be more generous than the standard-form and that there is
indeed evidence that this discretion is exercised. To the extent that the cases on, in particular, oral
express warranties expanding upon the limiting language of a standard-form show that agents are
making promises before the contract is even entered into, the cases themselves provide even more
evidence of the kind of bargaining I discuss, including evidence suggesting that the bargaining to
vary the terms of the standard-form may often occur much earlier, at the contract formation stage.
110. See Towers Charter & Marine Corp. v. Cadillac Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir.
1990) (citing Rose v. Spa Realty Assocs., 366 N.E.2d 1279, 1283 (N.Y. 1977)); see also Wis. Knife
Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986) (interpreting oral promises modifying
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Courts have dealt with consumer-sales contracts falling under the Uniform Commercial Code in a somewhat more liberal way. On the one hand,
111
under section 2–316(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, standard-form
terms attempting the “negation or limitation” of express oral warranties are
112
“inoperative” to the extent that they conflict with the express warranty.
While this might seem to make it too easy for a consumer buyer to falsely
claim that a firm’s agent made an express warranty expanding on standardform promises, comment 2 to this same section, dismisses this worry with
the explanation that “[t]he seller is protected under this Article against false
allegations of oral warranties by its provisions on parol and extrinsic evidence and against unauthorized representations by the customary ‘lack of
113
authority’ clauses.” Neither of these points is convincing. A standard-form
clause stating that an agent lacks actual authority can and sometimes should
be overcome by showing a pattern or practice of agent representations and
promises that establishes apparent agent authority. The Code’s parol evidence rule is, moreover, very liberal in allowing for the admission of
evidence of “course of dealing or usage of trade” to “explain” or “supple114
ment” standard-form terms. Especially given the language of section 2–
313 that a buyer need not show any “particular reliance” for oral express
affirmations of fact “made by the seller about the goods during a bargain” to
115
become part of the parties’ contract, the courts have generally admitted
parol evidence of such affirmations and have ruled that they override the
116
warranty exclusion clause of a standard form.
Turning to consumer-credit transactions, the Uniform Commercial
Code’s liberal attitude toward course of performance evidence has led some
courts to be too ready to find that a pattern of forgiving conduct has overridden standard-form terms. This is dramatically illustrated by the split of
authority on the issue of whether a consumer creditor who has accepted late
payments as a matter of course may still insist upon the validity of a stanwritten contracts which by their terms prohibit oral modifications as enforceable under U.C.C. § 2209 as waivers when there is proof of reliance). It is perhaps worth noting that standard economic
theory of contract renegotiation cannot explain why courts would ever enforce a modification when
the contract itself prohibited modifications. However, just as I have constructed an adverse selection
– based explanation for enforcing such modifications, so too has Patrick W. Schmitz, Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?, 21 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 315
(2005) shown that certain kinds of contractual moral hazards can also justify enforcing such modifications.
111.

U.C.C. § 2-316(a) (1998).

112. As comment 1 to U.C.C. § 2–316 explains, “[t]his section is designed principally to deal
with those frequent clauses in sales contracts which seek to exclude ‘all warranties, express or implied.’ It seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by
denying effect to such language when inconsistent with language of express warranty . . . .” U.C.C.
§ 2–316 cmt. 1 (1998).
113.

U.C.C. § 2–316 cmt. 2 (1998).

114.

U.C.C. § 2–202(a) (1998).

115.

U.C.C. § 2–313 cmt. 5 (1998).

116. See Richard F. Broude, The Consumer and the Parol Evidence Rule: Section 2–202 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1970 Duke L.J. 881, 917; see also James J. White & Robert S.
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 12–4 (4th ed. 1995).
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dard-form clause stating that such a pattern of behavior does not waive its
117
rights to insist upon timely payment (an antiwaiver clause). One general
approach holds that if the creditor has in fact induced the consumer borrower to rely upon the ability to make late payments, then the creditor is
estopped from reasserting its standard-form rights unless it first notifies the
borrower. An alternative view holds that on basic Code principles of assent,
a secured creditor’s course of conduct may effectively change the meaning
of the contract so that regardless of reliance, by accepting late payment, a
creditor has waived its own standard-form antiwaiver provision. In such
case, the creditor can reinstate its right to insist upon timely payment only if
it gives the borrower reasonable notice that it is reverting back to the original, standard-form policy (and then only if the borrower has not materially
changed its position in reliance on the waiver).
On my theory, both of these approaches to creditor waiver of a standardform no-waiver clause fail to recognize the informational, screening function of creditor forgiveness. Creditors allow late payments as a kind of
experiment even though they are not obligated to do so by their standardform agreement. What creditors are trying to discover is borrower type: is
this a “good” borrower, one with a temporary problem only and whose business we want to keep as a customer, or is this a “bad” borrower, one who
really cannot make the agreed-upon payments and who is not worth keeping
as a customer. When the creditor discovers a bad type, it will revert to the
standard-form right to timely payment, which when not forthcoming will
then allow it to declare the borrower in default and exercise its various standard-form default rights. On the margin, the risk that courts will find that
tolerating late payments has entailed a loss of standard-form contractual
rights makes forgiveness a riskier strategy for creditors. If the risk is significant enough so that creditors find forgiveness too costly, then they will
respond by making the basic credit terms—interest rate, repayment period,
and the like—tougher, thereby excluding from the market precisely those
good faith, but ex-ante risky consumer borrowers that the courts are undoubtedly anxious to help, not hurt.
VI. Standard-Form Contracts Opting Out of Civil
Liability as Determinants of the Viability of
the Discretionary Benefits Equilibrium
As I mentioned at the outset of the previous section, the kind of standard-form terms that I analyzed in that section, mainly governing the firm
and customer’s respective performance obligations, are not those that have
been the center of contemporary litigation and controversy. The most controversial standard-form terms are those that govern the resolution of
breakdowns in the parties’ relationship, breakdowns that reflect a failure
of private cooperative resolution. Examples include clauses selecting the
117. The discussion here is drawn from the opinion in Tillquist v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 714
F. Supp. 607, 611-12 (D. Conn. 1989).
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forum, or law, in which litigation will take place, and, even more contro119
versially, contract clauses mandating the arbitration of disputes. Such
clauses are increasingly common not only in consumer contracts, but also in
individual employment contracts. The Supreme Court has endorsed the use
of such clauses in both contexts, even where the underlying consumer or
employee complaint invokes a right created by federal statute. At the same
time, the Court has made clear that the ultimate enforceability of such
clauses remains a matter of state law, so that state judges are free to strike
them down as substantively or procedurally unconscionable.
Applying the classical exploitation theory of standard-form contracts to
the new wave of employment-dispute arbitration contracts, academic commentators have for the most part urged such judicial invalidation of
mandatory arbitration clauses in employment and consumer contracts. In
120
critiquing the Court’s decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
my colleague Clyde Summers has recently provided an eloquent and succinct statement of this position:
The Gilmer arbitration clause had three basic characteristics that are
common to all employment contracts which seek to substitute private arbitration processes for public judicial processes. First, the arbitration
provisions were not negotiated by the parties; they were constructed by the
employer, or its lawyers, with an eye toward protecting and furthering the
interests of the employer and were presented in a standard-form contract
which the employee had to accept without change if he wanted to work.
Second, the employee is frequently not made aware of an arbitration provision buried in the fine print or in an employee handbook. In Gilmer, the
provision was not even in the employment contract, but in the exchange’s
registration application that the employee was required to sign before being hired. Even when the provision is visible, the employee may not
understand its impact or the rights that he is waiving. Third, the employee
has no practical choice but to agree to the employer’s prescribed terms if
he wants to obtain or retain the job. The choice is between agreeing and
being unemployed, for other potential employers may have equivalent contract clauses. In Gilmer, refusal to sign would have effectively barred Mr.
Gilmer from working in the securities industry. The increasing commonness of these provisions in other industries significantly affects job
opportunities. These employer-designed arbitration structures are properly
described by the Court as “mandatory arbitration.” They are more descrip121
tively characterized as “take-it-or-leave-it” contracts.

On my theory of standard-form contracting, such general hostility toward mandatory arbitration clauses is ill-founded and inimical to the kinds
118.

See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991).

119. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 448 (2003); Green Tree Fin.
Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82-83 (2000); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
120.

500 U.S. 20 (1991).

121. Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the
Unwilling To Arbitrate, 6 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 685, 686-88 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
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of cooperative consumer-firm and employee-employer relationships that are
presumably everyone’s desired objective. The case for judicial enforcement
of standard-form arbitration clauses does not deny that there are opportunistic employers and consumer-goods manufacturers who will attempt to write
complicated and technical arbitration clauses that effectively take away the
employee or consumer’s right to press her dispute. But when courts have
seen such clauses—that either foist all the costs of arbitration on the employee or consumer, or give the employer or firm discretion to choose
arbitrators who are biased in its favor—they have almost uniformly struck
122
down the clauses as substantively unconscionable.
Such a judicial approach is perfectly consistent with my earlier analysis
of the proper judicial attitude toward the enforcement of firm promises to
add to standard-form promises.
The problem with the exploitation theory of mandatory arbitration
clauses is that it focuses on these egregious, worst-case clauses—which
courts will not enforce and which are surely a short-lived opportunistic exception—without advancing any explanation as to the general economic
function served by reasonable mandatory arbitration clauses. Here, I develop such a theory, one that shows why legal enforcement of arbitration of
disputes that arise at the end of a consumer-firm or employee-employer relationship is crucial to the ability of firms and consumers and employers and
employees to pursue the kind of tailored forgiveness and complaint-based
benefits strategies that govern the performance of their ongoing and continuing relationships. On my analysis, the question is what sort of disputeresolution regime best encourages cooperative resolution of performance
problems in ongoing relationships, resolution that occurs in the shadow of
the firm’s standard-form contract. The answer begins with a stylized description of what it is that mandatory arbitration clauses get the parties out
of, the present day civil liability system.
A. The Pathologies of Contemporary American Civil Liability
The first problem with civil liability from the point of view of encouraging firms to cooperatively resolve problems with customers and employees
is not really a problem with the contemporary American civil liability system, but one that is inherent in any formal public legal system: its
publicness. A public record of legal proceedings and a tradition of written,
publicly available judicial opinions designed to create precedent for the future differs dramatically from private arbitration, where the default is that

122. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 614 (D.S.C. 1998) (holding arbitration clause unconscionable where employer had total control over arbitrators); Knepp v.
Credit Acceptance Corp., 229 B.R. 821, 837-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (finding unconscionable an
arbitration clause in which debtor would be required to pay the costs of arbitration); Graham v.
Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981) (holding arbitration clause substantively unconscionable
where nonunion members forced to arbitrate before union arbitration panel); Abramson v. Juniper
Networks, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 658-60 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that an express provision requiring
an employee to pay half the costs of arbitration was unconscionable).
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decisions do not generate publicly available written opinions and there is no
publicly available record of the proceedings.
The next thing to recognize about the American civil liability system is
peculiar to the contemporary American system. This is that for product
manufacturers and employers, that system is increasingly one that imposes
precisely the kind of broad mandatory standard-form terms that I earlier
123
concluded were unlikely to be in the interest of consumers and firms.
While some of these terms impose substantive limitations—product manufacturers cannot, for example, contractually exclude liability for personal
124
injury caused by defective products —the most important standard-form
terms imposed by civil liability systems are those governing, or, more accurately, not governing, the determination of damages. Under both state
common law and federal statutes that protect consumers and employees,
firms are liable not only for compensatory but also punitive damages for
violations of a wide variety of mandatory standard-form terms (such as strict
products liability and workplace discrimination). Somewhat tautologically,
because firms cannot contract out of various mandatory substantive obligations imposed by state and federal consumer- and employee-protection
legislation, when they contract for arbitration rather than civil liability as a
means of resolving endgame disputes, it is the civil liability system of
awarding damages that they are contracting out of.
What is the civil liability damage system? It is one that not randomly but
systematically tends toward both undercompensation and overcompensation. It overcompensates in cases where there is a relatively large loss and
undercompensates plaintiffs who have suffered relatively small losses. Cases
involving very large losses are straightforward to understand. Although they
may occur with low probability, when they do occur, the injured consumer
or employee has an individually viable lawsuit that carries with it a highly
uncertain probability of a mega-damage award in the hundreds of millions
or billions of dollars that substantially overcompensates the plaintiff. As I
shall explain momentarily, while rare, such cases have a disproportionate
influence on firm/employer behavior. The more common products or employment case involves not catastrophic loss but a loss that is so small to
each consumer or employee that no individual would find it rational to bring
a lawsuit for damages. Modern civil procedure has solved that problem with
class-action litigation, a device which permits the aggregation of lots of little
claims into a large claim. Such aggregation, however, does nothing to
change the incentives of an individual to bring a lawsuit. Such an individual
still has little at stake and no reason to sue. Class actions work not by chang123. For this important point, I am indebted to Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as
Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 McGeorge
L. Rev. 195 (1998).
124. See U.C.C. § 2–719(3) (1998) (“Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable”). The only way to avoid such
liability contractually is to warn the consumer against product risks, but such warnings do not apply
to the risks caused by defective products, and the warnings themselves may be found inadequate,
which makes even a non-defective product defective (for failure to include an adequate warning).

JOHNSTON FINAL TYPE2.DOC

March 2006]

2/16/2006 8:38 AM

The Return of Bargain

895

ing the incentives of individual consumers, but by allowing plaintiff’s attorneys to recover substantial compensation for pursuing the claims of a class
of such harmed individuals. Because no individual consumer or employee
has much at stake in such litigation, no individual has an incentive to actively monitor the attorneys who are ostensibly representing her interests.
Without any real client to limit her discretion, the plaintiff’s class-action
attorney is subject only to the highly variable but generally exceedingly deferential oversight of the trial judge. Under this system, class-action attorneys
are free to strike mutually beneficial settlement deals with the product
manufacturer defendants. Under a typical deal of this sort, a product manufacturer whose product has actually caused, say, $100 million in harm to
consumers will agree to settle for far less, say $50 million, a substantial
fraction of which, such as $10 million, goes to the plaintiffs’ attorneys. Consumers as a group end up with $40 million, far less than the $100 million
that they would be entitled to in an ideal system.
A class-action system that generates such outcomes is subject to the obvious criticism that by grossly undercompensating individual class
members, it has also grossly underdeterred product manufacturers or employers. Such criticism commits the mistake of comparing the real with the
ideal. Relative to a world without the class-action device, the existing system at least generates some compensation and some deterrence. More
importantly for present purposes, however, is to understand how there is a
realistic alternative—private arbitration—and one that creates better incentives for firms to bargain to establish and maintain lasting, cooperative
relationships with consumers and employees.
B. Cooperative Relationships Are More Likely in the Shadow
of Arbitration than under the Risk of Civil Liability
Recall from my earlier analysis that it is the business value of the relationship—the value of an individual as a repeat buyer or as a trusted
employee—that the strategy of tough standard-form terms coupled with tailored forgiveness and complaint-based benefits is designed to further. Such a
strategy can breakdown entirely when the firm faces a risk of being sued in
the civil liability system if the consumer or employee does not get all that
she demands by way of forgiveness or additional benefits. There are several
reasons for the breakdown. The first has to do with the inherent quality of
publicly funded dispute resolution. If the firm’s practice of sometimes paying benefits and sometimes not is litigated in court, the firm may be found to
have established a new, standard practice of paying such benefits. It may
also be taken to have admitted liability—benefits are paid, after all, when
the firm admits that the customer or employee has a valid complaint. What
was meant to have been discretionary will become a mandatory, liability
triggering duty. Similarly, if the firm sometimes forgives employee malfeasance or consumer delays in payment, then not only does it encourage
opportunistic behavior by employees and customers, but it may be held to
have established a new standard-form promise to do so in all cases.

JOHNSTON FINAL TYPE2.DOC

896

2/16/2006 8:38 AM

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:857

The other and in some ways even more problematic aspect of civil liability is the way that expectations about the magnitude of civil liability, rather
than customer or employee value, can come to dominate and overwhelm the
firm’s thinking about customer and employee relationships. The large variation in civil-damage awards makes expected ex-post liability outcomes,
rather than the perceived business value of cooperative resolution, a key determinant of what firms are willing to do. Firms have too great an incentive
to resolve “cooperatively” complaints of questionable validity involving
large customer or employee loss, and too weak an incentive to resolve much
125
more clearly valid, but small customer and employee claims.
Now consider the management of employee and customer relationships
under arbitration. The first difference, and a profound one, is that because
arbitration proceedings are not public, the firm does not have to worry that
cooperative resolution of employee and customer complaints, or forgiveness
of customer or employee contractual shortfalls, will establish a binding
precedent that converts these discretionary acts into mandatory obligations
126
applying to all employees and customers with legally similar situations.
Thus, under arbitration, the extension of benefits or forgiveness to deserving
employees and customers does not mean that the firm has opened the door
to opportunistic claiming.
The second profound difference between civil liability and arbitration
goes to the pattern of outcomes and damage awards. In terms of outcomes,
the three sharpest differences between arbitration and civil litigation are: 1)
that plaintiffs succeed at a much higher rate in arbitration than they do in
civil cases that go to trial; 2) that while plaintiffs get about the same median
award in both civil trial and arbitration, they get a higher mean award and
much larger damages in big, catastrophic cases in civil trial than arbitration;
and, 3) because of the overall cost savings, plaintiffs are able to find attorneys to represent them and hence pursue some smaller cases that they would
127
not pursue in the civil liability system.
The significance of these differences is that under arbitration, the loss
suffered by a particular employee or customer will not be nearly as big a
determinant of the firm’s breakdown payment to the employee or customer
as it would be under civil liability. The firm’s incentive to accommodate and
maintain an employee or customer relationship merely to stave off costly
civil liability does not exist under arbitration. Because the required payment
that the firm must make to an employee or customer when the relationship
125. This is true notwithstanding the availability of the class action, since for small and medium sized claims, class actions will not be economically attractive to plaintiffs’ attorneys unless
there are a very large number of such claims that may be aggregated. It is true that in cases where
the individual claim is small but there are a large number of claimants, the class action may be economically viable when individual arbitration is not.
126. A similar point, but in a rather different context, is made by Bernstein, supra note 1, at
1743, 1776.
127. Conclusions reached in a survey of empirical findings of arbitration versus civil litigation
are presented in Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. Rev.
105, 108–17 (2003).
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ends tends to be relatively uniform under arbitration, that payment will have
less influence on whether the firm acts to prevent the relationship from ending than it would under civil liability. When the value of the continuing
relationship to the firm and employee/customer has little to do with the employee or customer’s loss in a particular instance, both the firm and the
employee/customer are better off when it is the potential future value of the
relationship, rather than the damages in a particular case, that determines
their joint behavior in promoting its continuation.
Appendix
Ex-post versus Ex-ante Screening of Opportunistic Borrowers
The claim in the main text was that if firms are not allowed to exercise
their discretion to identify consumer borrowers ex post, renegotiating only
with those that they find to have a legitimate reason for failing to pay on
time and effectively screening out opportunistic borrowers, then firms will
not be able to replicate such screening with different standard-form terms,
such as the interest rate. This appendix demonstrates this assertion for a
simple but fairly general model.
Assume that a one-period loan is made in the amount L at interest rate r,
and that there are two types of consumer, a good type who will repay the
full amount L unless she suffers misfortune, in which case she can repay
nothing. The probability of misfortune is given by q. There is also a bad
type of consumer who will always claim to have suffered benefit B from
using the borrowed money. Assume that at repayment time, the firm’s manager will have learned enough to perfectly distinguish a good from bad type
of borrower, so that under a policy of discretionary forgiveness, the loan will
be forgiven if and only if the manager determines that the borrower is a
good type who has really suffered misfortune. Ex ante, when the loan is
made, the firm only knows the probability p of a good type (and so also the
probability (1 – p) of a bad type) of borrower. I begin with the simplest case,
in which the borrower is able to keep its entire benefit B when it fails to repay the loan (the loan was entirely used up in consumption).
The first proposition is that for any given interest rate r, the firm is better
off when it pursues discretionary forgiveness than when it does not. This
follows immediately from comparing the firm’s expected payoff when it
pursues discretionary forgiveness, which is given by:
(1 – q)rL – qL = L(r – q(1 + r))

(1)

while its expected payoff when it does not pursue discretionary forgiveness
is given by:
p[(1 – q) rL - qL] - (1 – p)L

(2)

Comparing (1) and (2), we see that the firm will always be better off
when it investigates the truth of the borrower’s ex-post claim because otherwise it will never be repaid by the bad-faith borrower.
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By the same type of argument, the bad-faith borrower will always have a
higher expected payoff, of simply B, when it is not investigated ex post, than
when it is, in which case the bad borrower’s expected payoff will be
(1 – q)(B – (1 + r)L) + qB = B – (1 – q)(1 + r)L (3),
which is equal to the expected payoff that the good borrower gets regardless
of whether or not the firm pursues a policy of discretionary forgiveness.
To prove the claim in the text, observe first that under the discretionary
forgiveness policy a mutually beneficial interest rate exists only if there exists an r such that both (1) and (3) are bigger than zero. For both (1) and (3)
to be bigger than zero, it must be that both:

r>

q
1− q

(4)

r<

B
(1 − q)L

(5)

These conditions just say that the higher the probability of nonpayment,
the higher the interest rate must be for the loan to be profitable for the
lender, while the borrower can pay a higher interest rate and still take the
loan, the higher the ratio of its benefit to the loan amount and the higher its
probability of not having to pay the loan back is. A necessary and sufficient
condition of an r satisfying both (4) and (5) is that qL < B, the borrower’s
benefit must exceed the lender’s expected loss due to nonpayment.
Were the firm to eschew the discretionary forgiveness policy, the interest
rate that it would need to charge in order for the loan to be profitable would
instead be given by:

r>

1− p
q
+
p(1 − q) 1 − q

(6)

The right hand side in (4) is unambiguously less than the right hand side
in (6). When the lender eschews the discretionary policy, it must toughen the
standard-form term, the interest rate. Indeed, from (6) we can see that for a
sufficiently low p, the probability of a good borrower type, there will not
exist an interest rate such that the lender expects a positive payout. If the
lender is not allowed to exercise discretionary forgiveness, but borrower
opportunism is sufficiently likely, then it will not make the loan at all.

